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BACK TO BASICS: DISTINGUISHING REAL AND 
PERSONAL RIGHTS IN WAGONER V. CHEVRON USA 
INCORPORATED II 
Michael C. Wynne∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No discussion of oil and gas operations in Louisiana would be 
complete without the discussion of “legacy” litigation. In 
Louisiana legacy suits have proliferated. A legacy lawsuit refers to 
a suit by a landowner claiming that oil and gas operations caused 
damage to his property through contamination or pollution.  
Legacy suits impose substantial burdens on the oil and gas 
operators allegedly responsible for damage to contaminated 
property and production sites. Even before a legislative response 
was made to these economically damaging suits, Louisiana courts 
developed and refined a jurisprudential rule referred to as the 
“Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.” This judicially-created doctrine 
provides that a purchaser cannot recover from a third-party for 
damage inflicted prior to the sale.1 The distinction between real 
and personal rights is fundamental for a proper understanding of 
the doctrine. This paper will discuss the operation of the 
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, and the importance of the 
distinction between real and personal rights, through the lens of the 
influential Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated2 (“Wagoner 
II”) decision.  
 ∗   J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2014) Paul M. Hébert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier 
Moréteau and acknowledge the tireless efforts of the Journal of Civil Law 
Studies’ staff. 
 1.  Ashley M. Liuzza, Buyer Beware: How Purchasers are Left Holding 
the Bag When it comes to Property Damages, 57 LOY. L. REV. 375, 381 (2011). 
 2.  Wagoner v. Chevron USA, Inc., 48,119 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/24/13), 121 
So. 3d 727 [hereinafter Wagoner II]. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated (“Wagoner I”) 
Understanding the breadth and purport of the Wagoner II 
decision requires insight into the earlier related judgment, 
Wagoner I.3 In Wagoner I, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed a surface owners’ claim for damages against 
lessees for contamination of the land that took place prior to the 
surface owners’ acquisition of the same. The court, articulating the 
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine stated:  
The general rule, often referred to as the subsequent 
purchaser doctrine, is that a purchaser cannot recover from 
a third party for property damage inflicted prior to the sale. 
It is the landowner at the time of the alleged damages who 
has a real and actual interest to assert a claim.4 
More importantly, for the purposes of this note, the court 
premised their decision on the following analysis:  
The right to damages conferred by a lease, whether arising 
under a mineral lease or a predial lease, is a personal right, 
not a property right . . . it does not pass to the new owners 
of the land when there is no specific conveyance of that 
right in the instrument of sale.5 
Relying upon the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, the court 
ruled in favor of the defendant lessees, based on an exception of no 
right of action. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not parties 
to the mineral leases obtained by the operator who damaged the 
land and the landowner who held the real right of ownership at the 
time of the injury.6 However, the court suggested, in dicta, that the 
subsequent landowners could have brought a claim for these 
damages if they had secured an express assignment of the right to 
 3.  Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated, 55 So. 3d 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 
2010) [hereinafter Wagoner I]. 
 4.  Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
 5.  Id. at 23.  
 6.  Id.  
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sue the mineral lessees for property damage that took place before 
their purchase of the property.7 
B. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated (“Wagoner II”) 
After the Wagoner I decision, the plaintiffs (“assignees”) 
obtained an assignment of 99% of the rights from the owners of the 
mineral servitudes (“assignors”), and for a second time brought 
suit to recover for damages to the property caused by oil 
exploration and production by the lessees.8 Significantly, the 
assignors, unlike the assignees, had a real right in the land at the 
time the property was damaged by the lessees’ operations. The 
assignors conveyed a personal right (the right to request damages) 
through the assignments to their assignee, the subsequent surface 
owners.  
In Wagoner II, the primary issue before the court was whether 
the assignees’ acquisition of the assignors’ right to sue for damages 
to the property changed the capacity in which the subsequent 
surface owners appeared, such that the assignee could defeat the 
defendants’ claims of res judicata. At first blush, the question 
before the court was purely procedural, and the court dispensed 
with the issue concluding that in Wagoner II, the subsequent 
surface owners, through the aforementioned assignments, “stepped 
into the shoes” of the prior assignees who had a real interest in the 
property at the time of the damage.9 The court reasoned that in 
Wagoner I the subsequent surface owners filed suit in their 
capacity as present surface owners who acquired the property after 
the damage occurred. However, in Wagoner II, the subsequent 
surface owners sued in their capacity as assignees of the rights of 
the prior mineral servitude owners. This change in capacity was 
sufficient to defeat the defendants’ claims of res judicata.  
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Wagoner II, 121 So. 3d at 727. 
 9.  Id. at 729.  
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The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding in favor of 
the defendants’ exception of res judicata in relation to the claims 
brought by the plaintiffs in their capacity as “surface owners” as 
adjudicated in Wagoner I.10 These claims were dismissed with 
prejudice. However, the assignees’ claims brought in their capacity 
as the mineral servitude owners’ assignees survived the 
defendants’ exceptions of res judicata. The matter was remanded 
for further proceedings on those claims.11 Dispensing with the 
procedural issue at hand, Wagoner II demonstrated the application 
of the dicta from Wagoner I. The distinction between real and 
personal rights was an outcome-determinative feature in the 
Wagoner decisions.  
III. COMMENTARY 
A. Patrimonial Rights and their Subdivision 
A patrimonial right is one susceptible to monetary evaluation.12 
Patrimonial rights are further divided into real rights and personal 
rights (credit rights), and it is this distinction that was 
determinative in Wagoner II.13 Real rights, unlike personal rights, 
require only one subject, the holder of the right.14 This holder 
exerts “a direct and immediate power over the thing which is the 
object of the right.”15 In contrast, a personal right, such as a credit-
right, “presupposes an active subject, the creditor or obligee, and a 
passive one, the debtor or obligor.”16 Because a real right is 
exerted directly over a thing, it is considered “absolute” (in the 
sense that the holder of a real right can hold it against everyone).17 
 10.  Id. at 735-36.  
 11.  Id. at 736.  
 12.  ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL: 
A PRÉCIS 25 (LexisNexis 2006).  
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. at 8 (§1.5).  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. at 9.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] WAGONER V. CHEVRON USA, INC. II 755 
 
In contrast, a credit-right is relative because its holder may only 
demand performance from a specific debtor.18 
The distinction between real and personal rights is muddled in 
practical application. This distinction is particularly problematic 
“when the performance relates to a thing, especially an immovable 
thing.”19 Professor Litvinoff provided an example of this difficulty 
and set forth the proper analysis to navigate the problem. He 
articulated:  
Thus, the indemnity owed to an owner for the expropriation 
of a part of his immovable property, and the damages owed 
to the owner of a thing for its partial destruction or for an 
interference with his rights in it, belong to the person who 
was owner at the time of the expropriation, destruction, or 
interference, as the right to demand indemnity or to demand 
damages is a personal right that is not transferred together 
with the thing.20 
In the case of ownership or other real rights the actor has direct 
power over a thing, which may be held against the world; whereas, 
in the case of personal rights, such as the right to damages arising 
out of damage to an immovable, the actor’s right is relative (in the 
sense that the actor is entitled to receive a performance from only 
one or more persons in particular). In the instant case, the right to 
claim damages arising out of the pollution of a landowner’s 
immovable property is a personal right. 
B. Application: Personal Rights in the Wagoner Decisions 
The Wagoner decisions represent prominent examples of the 
problem identified above: instances when the performance of an 
obligation relates to a thing, especially an immovable thing. 
Consequently, the determination of the nature of the rights in 
Wagoner I and II is as essential as it is challenging. In the Wagoner 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  SAÚL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE. THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS 46 (§3.3) (2d ed., West 2001). 
 20.  Id., citing comment (e) to LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (emphasis added).  
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decisions, the courts accurately concluded that the right to damages 
arising out of the lease agreement between the lessee and the 
original landowner was a personal right, not a real right. As 
reproduced above, the Wagoner I court stated:  
The right to damages conferred by a lease, whether arising 
under a mineral lease or a predial lease, is a personal right, 
not a property right; it does not pass to the new owners of 
the land when there is no specific conveyance of that right 
in the instrument of sale.21 
This holding is consistent with the nature of the right springing 
from the damages to the land caused by the lessees’ conduct. As 
noted in the example provided above, damages owed to the owner 
of a thing for its partial destruction belong to the person who was 
owner at the time of the destruction, as the right to demand 
damages is a personal right that is not transferred together with 
the thing. This is the very conclusion the court reached in Wagoner 
I, when it determined that, absent a specific assignment of that 
personal right to collect damages from the previous owners, the 
subsequent landowners did not have a valid claim. 
The determination that the rights to claim damages under the 
lease were personal rather than real was significant. Namely, the 
subsequent landowners did not acquire a right to the action through 
their purchase of the land, as they would have if the right had been 
deemed “real,” in the sense that it “runs with the land.”22 As a 
consequence of the personal nature of the right, the subsequent 
owners needed to purchase the right to claim damages from the 
original owners.  
The right to sue for damages vested in the patrimony of the 
original owners and was not transferred with the property, and that 
is why an assignment of right to claim damages was necessary for 
the subsequent owners to bring a suit. It also explains why the 
plaintiffs sued in a different capacity after acquiring this right. 
 21.  Wagoner I, 55 So. 3d at 23.  
 22.  See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1763 & 1764. 
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Effectively, the subsequent landowners tested the dicta articulated 
by the Wagoner I court to the effect that a specific conveyance of 
that right would permit them to exercise the personal right to 
damages against the lessees. The subsequent landowners’ efforts 
were successful in that respect.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The exploration of the characteristics of real and personal 
rights is not a purely academic exercise; rather, this distinction can 
have significant consequences. Principally, for landowners, the 
lesson is that an act of conveyance should include a specific 
conveyance of any and all personal rights arising out of the 
ownership of the immovable. Prudent landowners who wish to 
acquire personal rights are cautioned by the Wagoner decisions to 
make these personal rights part and parcel to their bargain with the 
original landowner. For oil and gas operators, this decision could 
prove bothersome, as it demonstrates that a subsequent landowner, 
through an assignment of the personal right to claim damages, can 
acquire and effectively exercise that right even if the assignment 
does not occur in the original act of conveyance. These 
assignments do not increase an operator’s liability. However, they 
may provide a right to sue for damages to a more litigious 
landowner.  
 
 
